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Supervisor error on morning of explosion
Buncefield trial. Day 18. The supervisor on duty on the night of the Buncefield disaster realised a tank was overflowing but switched the wrong incoming pipeline, the High Court heard.
Minutes before the blast the worker switched an incoming pipeline to a different tank, but did not realise it was another line that was filling tank 912, source of the spill.
The trial also heard there was 'some confusion' about which tanks were being filled on the night of the disaster, with two pipelines - the Fina line and the UKOP line - feeding tanks 915 and 912 respectively.
Details of events have emerged in the evidence of Raymond Rich, an expert on oil storage operational negligence called by Chevron, who was in the witness box for a second day.
Jonathan Sumption QC, acting for Chevron, told the court: "At 5.59 on the day of the explosion Mr Nash, realising that 912 was overflowing, switched what he thought to be the pipeline from 912 to 911.
"That pipeline was in fact the Fina line.
"That indicated one minute before the explosion he was under the impression that the Fina line was feeding 912."
The court was told that a shift handover sheet, detailing which tanks were being filled by which pipeline, showed the Fina line filling 912 - but the figure two was overwritten with a five to make 915 - and the UKOP line feeding 912.
Mr Rich told the hearing Buncefield was 'higher risk' than other depots.
"From what I have seen in respect of lack of procedures and general operations the risk is higher than at other locations," he said.
"The risk there was higher because of the commercial and domestic properties in close proximity with the volume of products stored there in a small area."
The disaster was caused when tank 912 overflowed when alarms failed to sound, because of a stuck gauge, and a final automatic cut-out switch failed to operate because of a maintenance blunder.
Andrew Bartlett, acting for Total, said the gauge on tank 912 was stuck for a long period before the blast and this would have been clear from the computer system.
"For him (the supervisor] to look at the screen properly, which should only take a few seconds, and react to what he saw would be all it would take to avoid disaster," he said.
Under cross examination by Mr Bartlett, Mr Rich was asked about a log that showed the use of alarms during tank fills in the month prior to the blast.
Mr Bartlett said: "All those fills are consistent with close monitoring taking place."
Mr Rich replied: "They are consistent with monitoring taking place or good luck.
"I don't consider it's careful monitoring or consistent because the level of the product has got a little bit too high."
Mr Bartlett told the court four high level alarms had sounded during filling operations in the six months prior to the incident.
Mr Rich said: "They were an exceptional event but should not be used at all."
Total and Chevron were partners in the joint venture Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited (HOSL), which ran the part of the depot where the blast took place, but Chevron is seeking to prove Total was in fact in control and must pick up the bill for the disaster.
Residents and businesses are seeking damages of around 700million from Total and HOSL.
The trial continues.
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Thursday 09 February 2012
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