On Monday, December 8 Jonathan Sumption QC, giving Chevron's final submissions in the trial, told the court Total 'failed to respond' to a near-miss incident in 2003 and he again criticised the lack of proper procedures for tank filling.

"Total failed to respond to a near-miss incident which exposed the failures in 2003," he said.

"It's common ground there was no written procedure for tank filling.

"If there had been a risk analysis for tank filling there would have been a corresponding task procedure but in fact there was no such task procedure."

Mr Sumption criticised the fact that a fifth of tank fillings in the six months prior to the blast relied on alarms to know when a tank was full, given the alarms relied on gauges that were known to stick.

"Twenty one per cent is altogether an unacceptable risk if the risk is that you blow up the whole of the terminal and many public buildings as well," he said.

Mr Sumption said the supervisor on the night of the blast switched the wrong incoming pipeline after discovering the overflow because of confusion caused by flaws in the shift handover system.

"It seems beyond dispute there was no proper handover procedure," he said.

Philip Edey, acting for Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited (HOSL), said despite what was said in various contracts, Total and not HOSL was in charge at the depot.

Presenting HOSL's final submissions he said: "You have to look beyond the contracts to see what was happening in terms of control at the terminal."

HOSL was a joint venture between Total and Chevron but the two are in dispute over who was in control of the terminal and who must foot the bill for the disaster.

Residents and businesses are seeking damages of around £700million from Total and HOSL.

The trial continues.